Scientific freedom: its grounds and their limitations by Wilholt, Torsten
 1 
Scientific Freedom: Its Grounds and Their Limitations 
Torsten Wilholt 
Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, 
Germany 
twilholt@uni-bielefeld.de 
 
Manuscript version.  
The original article is forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science and 
will be available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00393681. 
Abstract 
In various debates about science, appeal is made to the freedom of scientific research. 
A rationale in favor of this freedom is rarely offered. In this paper, two major argu-
ments are reconstructed that promise to lend support to a principle of scientific free-
dom. According to the epistemological argument, freedom of research is required in 
order to organize the collective cognitive effort we call science efficiently. According 
to the political argument, scientific knowledge needs to be generated in ways that are 
independent of the major political powers because of the important role it plays for 
the citizens and their capacity to form well-informed political preferences. Both argu-
ments are examined critically in order to identify their strengths and limitations. I ar-
gue that the scientific freedom established by both rests on a number of critical pre-
conditions, and that the arguments’ force must be weighed against competing societal 
interests and values in each case of their application. Appeal to a principle of scientific 
freedom should therefore never mark the end, but rather the beginning of a public 
debate about the ends and means of science. 
1. Introduction 
Appeal to scientific freedom or the freedom of scientific research is commonplace in 
contemporary debates over research ethics and over science policy. Two recent exam-
ples may serve as illustrations. In March 2009, the World Congress for Freedom of Scien-
tific Research convened at the European Parliament in Brussels. It was the second 
meeting of the congress and featured on its program, among others, the European 
Commissioner for Science and Research, members of several European governments, 
as well as a handful of Nobel laureates. The first meeting of the congress had been ini-
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tiated in response to restrictive legislation on stem cell research in Italy, and resulted 
in a declaration pronouncing the freedom of scientific research a “requirement for 
democracy, a civil and political right and one of the most important guarantees for 
man’s health and well-being, as long as it does not provoke damages to others” 
(World Congress for Freedom of Scientific Research, 2008, p. 1). 
The year before, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists published a statement entitled “Scientific Freedom and the Public Good”, which 
was publicly endorsed by Steven Weinberg, Harold Varmus, Leon Lederman and 
many other scientists. The statement was formulated under the impression that the US 
administration under President George W. Bush had attempted to tamper with the 
findings of government research on issues like stem cells, climate change, sex educa-
tion and contraceptives. In response, the UCS statement insists on government scien-
tists’ freedom “to conduct their work without political or private-sector interference”, 
and calls on Congress and the executive branch to codify this freedom (Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, 2008). 
On that note, there are in fact countries that provide constitutional protection for 
the freedom of scientific research, including Germany, where this has been an element 
of constitutional tradition since the mid 19th century. In the present German constitu-
tion, the chapter on basic rights contains the stipulation that “Art and science 
(Wissenschaft), research and teaching are free”.1 
Despite its frequent and often emphatic endorsement, it is not always particu-
larly clear what kind of liberties and protections a principle of freedom of research is 
intended to entail. Two very decisive ambiguities need to be noted at the outset. On 
the one hand, freedom of research can be understood just to imply that the scientists 
involved in research should themselves decide which projects and approaches to pur-
sue. Call this the “freedom of ends”. But over and above the freedom of ends, the 
principle of freedom of research is sometimes also appealed to in order to support the 
claim that society or the state must provide for the resources required to conduct all 
the research that the scientists deem important. This I shall call the “freedom of 
means”—recognizing, of course, that the associated claims need not always be quite as 
utopian as the expression suggests. 
                                                          
1 Grundgesetz, Art. 5 (3). (The word “Wissenschaft” used in the original has a wider meaning than the 
English “science”, comprising not only the natural and social sciences but also the humanities.) Similar 
clauses can be found in the constitutions of Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain, as well as in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became legally 
binding throughout most of the EU on 1 December 2009. Its 13th article reads: “The arts and scientific 
research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.” 
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A second ambiguity concerns the question of who is the subject of the freedom. 
At first glance, this seems to be the individual scientist. But curiously, certain limita-
tions of scientists’ freedom, such as their dependence on research group leaders, or on 
supportive reviews by their peers for grant approval, are not commonly criticized un-
der the rubric of freedom of research. Thus, it sometimes appears to be rather the right 
of a research community or even an entire discipline to determine its own research 
agenda by means of appropriate procedures of self-government which is the major 
concern behind appeals to scientific freedom.  
What will concern me in this paper is the question why. Why should the human 
activity of scientific research enjoy any of these particular liberties? Today, the princi-
ple of freedom of research is almost always offered without explicit argument. One 
task of this paper will therefore be to reconstruct its grounds. Two major ways of ar-
guing in favor of scientific freedom have been devised since at least the times of the 
Enlightenment, one of which one might call an epistemological argument, and the 
other a political one. They have both been historically important for establishing the 
idea of freedom of scientific research, but history will not be my main focus in this pa-
per. My aim in reconstructing the arguments will be to probe their strengths and limi-
tations in the contemporary context, in order to find out what kinds of liberties can 
reasonably be implied by the principle of freedom of research, and to assess what 
really is achieved by appealing to it in public debates about science. 
2. The epistemological argument 
What I will call the epistemological argument is a line of reasoning defined by its core 
premise, which can be formulated as follows: A principle of freedom of research creates 
optimal conditions for our collective search for knowledge. Variations of this premise have 
already been asserted by many of the early modern defenders of the freedom of phi-
losophizing, including Campanella (1975), Descartes (1965, p. 3), Milton (1918, pp. 43-
50) and Spinoza (1925, p. 243). Obviously, in order to add up to a substantial argu-
ment, further qualifications and further premises are required (most notably, a specifi-
cation of what ‘our collective search for knowledge’ is and the premise that, whatever 
it is, it is a good thing). But in trying to determine whether there is a version of the 
argument that can be systematically advocated today, I will start with this deliberately 
vague outline of the core premise.  
John Stuart Mill (1991, chapter 2) is usually credited with the idea of justifying 
the core premise by means of an appeal to the fallibility of human judgment (cf. 
Feyerabend, 1981, pp. 65-71, Kitcher, 2001, pp. 94-96, Longino, 2002, pp. 3-4). Mill’s is 
an argument for intellectual freedom broadly construed, on the grounds that an 
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opinion may be true even if the consensus of the best minds deems it false. By sup-
pressing an opinion, we might thus lose the opportunity to exchange an error for a 
truth. Even if the opinion is in fact false, its suppression still deprives humanity of the 
“livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error” (Mill, 1991, p. 21). 
But the argument from fallibility to the epistemic requirement of intellectual freedom 
is much older, as can be illustrated by the following passage from a speech by phi-
losopher Nicolas Gundling, delivered at the University of Halle in 1711: 
Step by step must the summit of truth be scaled, which rises between a thou-
sand rocks and shrubs of opinions, such that it is virtually impossible for even 
the most diligent not to slip here and there and collide and grasp false things, 
before they reach the place where there is no more occasion for erring and 
slipping. But now imagine that the erring were not tolerated, the deceived 
were suppressed, and the ones who had stumbled were trampled and chased 
away. Who could still ascend to that highest pinnacle of truth? Therefore, free-
dom must be conceded to reason. (Gundling 1722, p. 823) 
Gundling’s speech, now all but forgotten, caused a stir in early 18th century Prussia, 
because it called for complete freedom of teaching and research for all four of the uni-
versities’ faculties—a shocking conception at the time (cf. Paulsen 1896, pp. 530-531). 
A contemporary version of the argument from fallibility, adapted to support the 
freedom of scientific research, might be conceived along the following lines. All prior 
judgments about the fruitfulness of research projects are fallible. It can not be pre-
cluded that projects which are at present not recommendable according to widespread 
standards will turn out to be groundbreaking. Therefore, scientists should choose their 
approaches and projects freely, such that a wide variety of approaches ends up being 
pursued. Some of these will prevail and lead to new knowledge, but it is impossible at 
any time to predict which ones these will be. 
Two preconditions of this line of reasoning need to be inspected. One is the no-
tion that freedom of choice on the part of the scientists will actually lead to a diversity 
of approaches; the other is the supposition that a diversity of approaches will actually 
improve our collective attainment of knowledge more than our collective attainment 
of error. I will start with the latter. 
It is a venerable assumption that, under conditions of free inquiry, falsehoods 
will in the long run disappear while truths will prevail. I will call this the Milton 
asymmetry, after John Milton’s dictum: “Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?” (Milton, 1918, p. 59) The 
mechanism by which this is supposed to be brought about is already suggested in the 
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Milton quote: it is the mechanism of mutual criticism. Here is how Christian Wolff 
describes it as early as 1728:  
One person acknowledges the truth taught by the other and uses it to detect 
further truth. Another one points out an error that has been made or improves 
upon it; and the one who has made it acknowledges it and tries to correct it, if 
it has not already been corrected by others. Thus is the growth of the sciences 
advanced by means of joined forces. (Wolff, 1996, p. 228) 
The importance of mutual criticism has since been emphasized by many philosophers, 
perhaps most prominently by Mill (1991, chapter 2) and by Karl Popper (1972, pp. 33-
35, 260-261). More recently, David Hull (1988, pp. 305-321, 341-353) has pointed out 
the importance of scientists’ need to build up on the work of others as an incentive for 
checking each others’ results: The checking does not occur all the time, but it will hap-
pen every time a scientist suspects that the success of her own work is threatened by a 
possible mistake in another researcher’s result.  
It is appropriate to draw attention to the fact that the proper functioning of mu-
tual criticism presupposes a certain degree of independence amongst researchers. For 
example, if an error is systematically rooted in false background assumptions or in-
adequate methods, then mutual checking is unlikely to reveal this error as long as 
everyone adheres to the same methods and background assumptions. The historical 
fact of scientific revolutions demonstrates that scientists can under certain conditions 
attain the required independence to overcome even deep-rooted mistaken presump-
tions, but it cannot dispel each and every doubt that the collective bias of the scientific 
community may still often make misconceptions undetectable even under conditions 
of open mutual criticism. Indeed, the proponent of the epistemological argument need 
not deny this. Her case rests on a relative epistemic advantage of diversity over uni-
formity. Ultimately, she only needs to claim that the chances of the sciences to display 
the Milton asymmetry in the long run are better given a diversity of approaches then 
they would be in a scientific monoculture. I will assume that the mechanism of mutual 
criticism justifies optimism that this is the case, as long as there is some independence 
among scientists.  
The other problem, of explaining why a principle of freedom of research is a par-
ticularly good means of creating a diversity of approaches, may be the more difficult 
one. The researchers’ desire for scientific credit can provide a starting point for an ex-
planation. Scientific credit is awarded according to priority rule: usually, only the first 
researcher to come up with a result is credited with it. Therefore, the chances of suc-
cess for an individual scientist not only depend on the intrinsic potential of her ap-
proach, but also on the number of other researchers who are pursuing the same ap-
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proach at the same time. If this number gets too high, she is likely to increase her indi-
vidual prospect of credit by switching to a different, less overrun approach—even if 
the latter should have lower intrinsic potential. In the case of a co-operative group, it 
will often be possible for each individual within the group to improve her prospects 
for credit if the whole group switches together. That way, a free choice of projects and 
approaches will lead to the allotment of some proportion of the total research effort to 
projects that, from the point of view of scientific orthodoxy, have less than optimal 
prospect of success.2  
It is however not sufficient to show that free choice of projects and approaches is 
likely to create some diversity. In order for the epistemological argument to succeed, 
freedom must be a better means of organizing cognitive diversity than other available 
ways. Could not the cognitive diversity in the sciences also be organized by one or 
more central authorities? What kind of advantages or disadvantages would that im-
ply? Such a centralized endeavor would certainly require the processing of a great 
amount of knowledge, both global and local. Here, global knowledge means knowl-
edge about seminal theories, about technological developments, about the past suc-
cesses and failures of diverse methods, about the state of the art in each approach to 
each problem and about the amount of research effort currently expended on it. Local 
knowledge, in contrast, is information about the faculties, skills and specialized 
knowledge of individual researchers, about the combination of these qualifications in 
actual groups, about existing and possible cooperation and networks, as well as about 
the availability of equipment at every particular research institution. Global as well as 
local knowledge in this sense is perpetually in flux and requires constant updating for 
reasonable decision-making. 
Centralized authorities would ideally have to possess complete and detailed 
global and local knowledge in order to distribute cognitive labor efficiently. While a 
great part of the required global knowledge can in principle be extracted from pub-
lished sources, the required local knowledge, which is initially dispersed over the 
whole scientific community, is obviously deeply problematic in this respect. The need 
to unremittingly ascertain this massive amount of local knowledge, bring it into a 
communicable form, communicate it to centralized authorities and process it there 
puts every centralized scheme of organizing the cognitive division of labor at a tangi-
ble disadvantage.  
                                                          
2 This explanation is modeled on Philip Kitcher’s description of the division of cognitive labor (1990, 
1993, chapter 8). Kitcher’s account is presented in a different argumentative context; the defense of a 
principle of freedom of research was not his intention. 
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Of course, the mechanism by which diversity arises from free choice of research 
approaches also presupposes that decentralized decision-makers have a lot of local 
knowledge—not only about their own local conditions, but also about those of their 
competitors. In contrast to a centralized authority, however, they can be satisfied with 
aggregated knowledge about the rest of the community. For example, a certain research 
group might base a reasonable estimation of their varying chances for success within 
two different possible approaches on the information that their amount of access to 
accelerator radiation is below average (relative to their sub-discipline), but they as a 
group possess an above-average concentration of mathematical skills. This kind of 
knowledge can plausibly be assumed to be available to researchers by way of induc-
tive generalization, as long as they regularly interact and communicate with a fairly 
representative proportion of their colleagues. It will typically be incomplete and less 
than optimally reliable, but not as incomplete and unreliable as what we would very 
probably get if we tried to gather up all the information required for producing the 
complete, detailed map of local knowledge that a centralized decision-maker would 
need. 
This variety of the argument bears some similarity to Friedrich Hayek’s (1945) 
epistemological case for liberalism. Critical as one can, and in my own opinion, should 
be of Hayek’s often sweeping assumptions and his implausible optimism that the 
market will make everything turn out right, he did identify a decisive advantage 
which decentralized schemes of decision-making sometimes have—their good access 
to, in Hayek’s words, “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” 
(ibid., p. 521). Nevertheless, it is befitting to note that the argument at issue is only 
loosely analogous to Hayek’s own line of reasoning; in particular, it is missing the dis-
tinctively economical element. The required aggregated local knowledge is not auto-
matically conveyed to the decentralized agents by means of a price mechanism, but 
has to be communicated by means of open and regular interaction between the mem-
bers of the community. 
Considered together, all these lines of reasoning do suggest that freedom of re-
search in a certain sense can in fact be an advantageous form of organization for a 
collective knowledge generating effort. But important qualifications have to be taken 
into account. So let us take stock. 
3. Qualifications and limitations regarding the epistemological ar-
gument  
As a first qualification, we will have to address the question of which variety of freedom 
of research can be supported by the epistemological argument. The claim that a prin-
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ciple of freedom of research leads to epistemically advantageous cognitive diversity is 
based on the researchers’ (or research groups’) ability to make a choice that reflects 
their local knowledge and their individual prospects for credit. This means that the 
epistemological argument can only support a principle of individual freedom of re-
search. The principle must entail that the choice should be made by the researchers or 
within the research groups that will actually perform the research. The argument can 
not be used to justify the principle that research decisions should be made somewhere 
within the discipline, or somewhere within the scientific community, because this 
claim cannot invoke the same epistemic advantages which make all the difference for 
the epistemological argument. The question of whether the epistemic argument can 
support only freedom of ends or also freedom of means depends crucially on the 
evaluation of the epistemic ends of the scientific enterprise. As a requisite for suc-
ceeding to motivate even a mere freedom of ends, the knowledge aimed at by scien-
tific research must promise to be at least potentially of some positive value to the po-
litical collective as a whole. The degree to which, in addition, freedom of ends is 
granted to any epistemic enterprise depends on the relative value of the knowledge 
aimed at as compared to the expected outcomes of other political measures or collec-
tive enterprises that compete over the resources of the community. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to attempt an assessment of this value for any particular scientific 
research program.3 For our present purposes, it is worthwhile noting that the value of 
a piece of scientific knowledge, and thus the extent and exact type of scientific free-
dom defensible on epistemological grounds, is likely to vary among scientific disci-
plines and even among scientific research programs. 
A second qualification is that the argument as presented presupposes an ade-
quate system of incentives for researchers, motivating them to try and come up first 
with solutions to scientific problems. Though the scientific credit system is in many 
cases up to the task, in some cases it may not be. In big science, for example, a single 
experiment can take the continuous effort of dozens of researchers over a time span of 
many years, with little opportunity for the participants to continuously earn credit 
along the way. Without centralized intervention, the credit system itself might not 
provide sufficient incentives to partake in this kind of research. 
A third and last qualification that I would like to call attention to is the following 
precondition: All researchers need constant updating of their global and, at least in 
aggregated form, also their local knowledge about the rest of the community. The 
principle of freedom of research, insofar as it can be supported by the epistemological 
argument, is thus inseparable from a principle of free and open interaction and com-
                                                          
3 For a convincing analysis of the issues that would be involved, see Bergström (1994). 
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munication within the sciences. Without this, the promised epistemic benefits of indi-
vidualized freedom of research can not be expected to unfold. 
In sum, the epistemological argument can plausibly show that under certain 
conditions—notably free communication and a functioning system of incentives—in-
dividualized freedom of research will lead to a diversity of scientific approaches that 
can be expected to surpass the epistemic yield of centralized forms of research organi-
zation. While this result is interesting enough to bar the dismissal of freedom of re-
search as pure rhetoric or scientific ideology,4 it also clearly falls short of what many 
defenders of the freedom of science had and have in mind. 
4. The political argument 
As noted above, there is a second line of reasoning which could be used to argue in 
favor of freedom of research and which is largely independent of the epistemological 
argument. It is in essence a political argument and arises from the consideration that 
scientific knowledge has become an important input for the democratic process. In 
making their political choices, citizens are in many ways relying on their beliefs about 
what the world is like, and ever so often they turn to science in order to resolve uncer-
tainties. On the basis of this observation, it can be argued that the practices and institu-
tions generating the scientific knowledge that citizens rely upon should enjoy inde-
pendence from the major political powers. Otherwise, the democratic process would 
be undermined, in a similar fashion as it would be if the press, for example, was sub-
ject to the control of the government. 
The political argument, too, has a long history. One of its earliest explicit uses 
was in Condorcet’s report to the French Legislative National Assembly, submitted in 
1792. He had been commissioned to propose ideas for the re-organization of science 
and education in post-revolutionary France. The following maxim is presented as one 
of the guiding principles of his sketch:  
Finally, no public power must have the authority, not even the standing, to 
prevent the development of new truths or the teaching of such theories that 
contradict its particular politics or its present interests. (Caritat 1968, p. 453) 
He explains that the continuous progress of the republic calls for unremitting criti-
cism, and that a public authority interfering with academic matters would thereby 
“contradict the purpose of the whole social institution: the perfecting of the laws.” 
(Ibid., p. 523) Variations of this argument were also used in the 19th century by democ-
                                                          
4 Some writers have been tempted to simply dismiss the notion in this way; see Hollinger (1990) and 
Sarewitz (1996), p. 10. 
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ratic theorists in the German countries at the time when scientific freedom was first 
formulated as a constitutional principle. As one of them summarized: 
The combination of these two principles, the rule of majorities in the realm of 
ends, and the rule of freedom and anarchy in the realm of theory, constitutes 
the only correct method of political life and progress. (Fröbel 1850, p. 107) 
There can be little doubt that the political argument has been of crucial importance for 
the historical development of scientific freedom as a political principle.5 However, the 
more important question for our present purposes is whether it can be reconstructed 
as a convincing argument in the context of today’s democratic societies. 
The core of the political argument seems to consist simply in the claim that po-
litically independent scientific research is such an important resource for democratic 
self-government that it deserves special protection. Put in this way, an apparent 
problem arises, suggesting that matters cannot be quite that straightforward. A special 
protection of science by means of a principle of freedom or autonomy is also a limita-
tion of the citizens’ power to govern themselves, because it would, if it is at all effec-
tual, have to limit the power of the citizens for example to put a stop to some line of 
scientific research—even if the majority did not approve of it. Political philosophers 
have discussed the same kind of problem with respect to the principle of freedom of 
speech, which, according to Ronald Dworkin (1985, pp. 62, 391), at the same time 
strengthens and weakens democracy and curtails the power of the citizens as a whole, 
for analogous reasons. 
This impression, however, depends on the idea that the relevant power of the 
citizens is adequately characterized as “the power to make it more likely that political 
decisions will be made as one wishes”, as Dworkin explicitly presupposes (ibid., p. 
62). This may be too restricted a view of the democratic process, because over and 
above the citizens’ capability of making their preferences count, another important 
dimension of their power is their ability to develop political preferences in the first 
place that adequately reflect their actual interests and values. If this dimension of their 
power is taken into account, it is no longer obvious that principles of free expression 
and free inquiry entail curtailments of the power of the citizens as a whole. This way 
                                                          
5 This is powerfully illustrated by the fact that it was the moderate liberal Friedrich Dahlmann who, in 
1848, first suggested placing the freedom of science under constitutional protection in Germany (to a 
committee convened by the German Confederation to devise a new constitution, cf. Hübner, 1967, p. 
76). Dahlmann himself had earlier given a defense of scientific freedom along the lines of the political 
argument; see Dahlmann (1886). His suggestion made it into the draft constitution of the 
Paulskirchenversammlung, which itself never went into effect, but which served as a blueprint for later 
democratic constitutions in Germany.  
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of addressing the problem suggests that the formation of political preferences on the 
basis of the exchange of information and arguments should be considered part and 
parcel of the democratic process, as has long been argued by proponents of delibera-
tive conceptions of democracy (in particular, see Cohen 1989). A view that takes pref-
erences as given and treats the democratic process as merely a means to their aggrega-
tion, in the words of Cass Sunstein, “fails to do what democracy should—that is, to 
offer a system in which reasons are exchanged and evaluated. A well-functioning sys-
tem of democracy rests not on preferences but on reasons.” (1997, p. 94) 
Based on these qualifications, the political argument for freedom of scientific re-
search can be articulated more precisely. The right point of departure is the observa-
tion that the crucial import of the democratic process is to lead to policies and deci-
sions that reflect the citizen’s well-informed political preferences. Only thus can democ-
ratic politics be said to be based on the citizens’ actual needs, interests and values. It is 
this characteristic that confers the kind of legitimacy on democratically constituted 
political power that other, non-democratic kinds of political procedures cannot be-
stow.6 But this legitimacy must end where executive or legislative action would 
threaten to undermine just those characteristics of the democratic process that are es-
sential for its legitimacy-conferring nature. These essential conditions include, among 
others, the citizens’ ability to gain the knowledge they require to develop well-in-
formed preferences. And they include free scientific research insofar as scientific 
knowledge is required for informed choices within today’s democracies. A principle of 
freedom of research established on the basis of this argument thus limits democrati-
cally legitimized power only at the point where its exertion would threaten to under-
mine its own legitimacy. 
Note that the political argument, thus conceived, is not just a variety of the epis-
temological one. Its aim is not to guarantee that the knowledge needed by the citizens 
is generated in as efficient a way as possible. Its punch line is rather that it must be 
generated in ways that are independent from the major political powers, because no 
political power can have legitimate control over the generation and distribution of the 
same knowledge that serves as an input to the democratic process without thereby 
undermining whatever democratic legitimacy might otherwise justify its control over 
science.7  
The idea that democratic power would be self-undermining if it extended so far 
as to include also power over the sources of those pieces of knowledge that feed into 
                                                          
6 Cf. Joshua Cohen’s (1996) articulation of the “ideal of democratic justification”. 
7 For a comparable analysis of a “right to inquiry” as a distinctively political conception see Brown and 
Guston (2009). 
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the democratic process is already present in the above quotes by Condorcet and in the 
thoughts of other Enlightenment thinkers. But science and society have changed since 
the time of the Enlightenment, and so the argument must be subjected to further scru-
tiny.  
5. Qualifications and limitations regarding the political argument 
One distinguishing feature of Enlightenment arguments for free inquiry is that they 
presuppose the subjects of this freedom to be participants in a public intellectual dis-
course—as perhaps most characteristically expressed in Immanuel Kant’s emblematic 
assertion that the “freedom in question” was the “freedom to make public use of one’s 
reason in all matters” (Kant, 1991, p. 55). It has been argued to be doubtful whether 
scientists can still lay claim to this kind of role in contemporary societies and sug-
gested that therefore the political argument does not carry over well to present condi-
tions of science (cf. Böhme, 2006). 
There is one aspect in which this criticism must be acknowledged to point out a 
limitation. The political argument does clearly not apply to research endeavors whose 
results never reach the participants of public political discourse. Thus, it cannot be 
appealed to in contexts where the accessibility of research results is going to be re-
stricted, be it for reasons of national security or on account of a sponsor’s commercial 
interests. Beyond this important caveat, however, there is little reason to restrict the 
import of the political argument to scientists qua public communicators. If governmen-
tal control over the public communication of research results would undermine the 
democratic process, then so would control over the research process generating these 
results. As long as research results keep finding their way into the public sphere, the 
fact that most scientists do not routinely participate in public discourse does not di-
minish the significance of the political argument. 
However, perhaps it is rather our trust in the political innocence of science that 
has diminished so much since the times of the Enlightenment that it undercuts confi-
dence in the political argument. As John Dewey wrote on the verge of World War II: 
“It is no longer possible to hold the simple faith of the Enlightenment that assured ad-
vance of science will produce free institutions.” (1988, p. 156) Of course, the above re-
construction of the political argument does not require us to adopt this simple faith. It 
rests on the much weaker claim that politically independent scientific research is one of 
the epistemic preconditions of a well functioning democratic political order in our 
time. 
Still, this might be regarded as presupposing the political innocence of science in 
a certain sense. After all, the political argument builds on the assumption that the re-
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sults of scientific research will help citizens to develop well-informed political prefer-
ences. It might seem that this presupposes the ability of science to provide information 
that is politically impartial, i.e. untainted by any political preferences that those in-
volved in its generation and dissemination may already hold. But this view of the po-
litical neutrality of science has been persistently criticized, in particular by those en-
gaging in social studies of science.8 Recent political controversies in which scientific 
input has played an important role, such as the disputes over genetically modified 
crops or the various debates related to climate change, have sometimes left analysts 
with the impression that science, instead of functioning as an impartial arbiter, more 
typically offers a breadth of positions on the respective matter, more or less reflecting 
the spectrum of political opinions in the wider population (cf. Sarewitz 2004). There is 
a plausible explanation of why the real world phenomena at issue in political contro-
versies often lack a uniform scientific assessment. These phenomena have found their 
way onto the research agenda not because they conveniently lend themselves to 
treatment in line with the well-tried methodology of an established laboratory prac-
tice, but in virtue of their social, economic and political significance. Their inherent 
complexity allows and demands a variety of methodological approaches. As Daniel 
Sarewitz concludes, “science, in doing its job well, presents this richness, through a 
proliferation of facts assembled via a variety of disciplinary lenses, in ways that can 
legitimately support […] a range of competing, value-based political positions.” (Ibid., 
p. 386) 
But do these observations and insights diminish the persuasiveness of the politi-
cal argument for the freedom of research? The question is not whether the presence of 
scientific practices and institutions that are not under the control of the major political 
powers puts citizens in an epistemic position that is perfectly adequate to the task of 
developing well-informed political preferences. It is rather whether this position is an 
essential improvement over an epistemic situation where there is no scientific research, 
or only such research as is conducted under the control of political powers. The situa-
tion of being confronted with conflicting voices of scientific expertise concerning the 
extent and likely consequences of global warming for example may be less then per-
fect, but it presents an epistemic advantage over the situation of never having heard of 
global warming, which would almost certainly be our condition if there had been no 
scientific research into the matter. Even if there was some scientific research, but it was 
conducted under the control of political powers, the probability would be high that 
out of the wide variety of methodological approaches permitted by the complex real 
world problem of climate change, those lines of research whose results happened to 
coincide with the particular interests of the controlling political powers would have a 
                                                          
8 For synopsis, see Bimber and Guston (1995) and Jasanoff and Wynne (1998). 
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markedly increased likelihood of being pursued and publicized. Arguably, this would 
most probably decrease the degree to which the totality of accessible research results 
adequately represents the actual threats and possibilities inherent in the situation that 
we find ourselves in. Having access to an adequate representation of those actual 
threats and possibilities, and be it in the form of a whole range of partly conflicting 
predictions, is an important starting point for the development of preferences that re-
flect our interests and values. Therefore, political independence of scientific research in 
an organizational sense can carry decisive epistemic advantages for the citizens, de-
spite the lack of political neutrality in typical real world cases of politically relevant 
research that many have observed. 
However, this advantage rests on an important precondition. I have argued that 
the variety of approaches pursued by politically independent scientists would indeed 
provide scientific results that, as a whole, constitute a more adequate representation 
than a more selective kind of research such as one would expect under conditions of 
political control. But this means, again, to assume that the scientific enterprise, if un-
controlled by the political powers, will in fact produce a pluralism of approaches. Un-
der the conditions of such pluralism, individual biases may balance each other and 
also provoke productive scientific debate (cf. Solomon 2001, esp. chapter 8). Without 
pluralism, there would be no reason to assume that the one-sided approach that the 
scientific community would settle on would put citizens into a better epistemic posi-
tion than the one-sided approach that might be favored by a government. As Helen 
Longino (1990, chapter 4) has argued, the degree to which scientific communities 
permit and encourage pluralism depends on the degree to which certain precondi-
tions are realized in their social organization, such as equality of intellectual authority, 
existence of recognized forums for criticism, and commitment to taking up criticism. 
For our present discussion, I wish to emphasize only the following: The persuasive-
ness of the political argument for freedom of research depends critically on the as-
sumption that research communities are organized in such a way as to encourage ex-
ploitation of the full range of varied approaches that real world problems permit.  
Another issue to address in assessing the strength and limitations of the political 
argument is the question of its scope. Clearly, not every branch of scientific research 
plays an equally important role in enabling the citizens to make well-informed politi-
cal judgments. Can the political argument nonetheless be applied to argue for political 
independence for all of science, or is it restricted to those areas of research that possess 
at least some degree of political relevance? 
Consider the following argument to the effect that the scope of the political de-
fense of scientific liberty should not be thus restricted. It is modeled on similar argu-
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ments which have been made for the case of unrestricted freedom of speech 
(Meiklejohn, 1961, esp. p. 262) and begins with the observation that the boundary be-
tween what is politically relevant scientific research and what is not is diffuse and 
non-obvious. If the restriction of the kind of freedom established by the political ar-
gument to politically relevant research alone was to be practically feasible, someone 
would thus have to draw the dividing line that defines the area of political relevance 
in science. But who? Neither the research communities themselves nor the political 
powers are disinterested enough to be entrusted with this task. In fact, in the hands of 
the political powers, the power inherent in such a monopoly of definition would equal 
exactly that power which the political argument is designed to keep in check in the 
first place. How could any institution or societal process be trusted to establish the 
definition of political relevance without succumbing to the interests of political pow-
ers? The enormous practical difficulties inherent in this question pragmatically justify 
a presumption in favor of setting up the kind of scientific freedom which the political 
argument supports in as inclusive a way as possible, in order to prevent it from being 
eroded from its fringes under political pressure. 
However, the political argument for free scientific research will inevitably be ap-
pealed to not only to claim a free choice of the ends of inquiry, but also to claim access 
to the required means for research in a way that is not under the immediate control of 
the government or other political parties. In fact, as far as the political argument is 
concerned, the freedom of ends becomes difficult to separate from the freedom of 
means. This is so because the generation of most scientific knowledge today requires 
great efforts and expensive equipment. If a politically independent science is impor-
tant for the democratic process, this should therefore also be reason enough for de-
mocratic states to provide means for this enterprise which would otherwise simply 
not get off the ground. But admitting freedom of ends while leaving the means pro-
vided under the control of the government would evidently thwart also the freedom 
of ends for all practical purposes. Applied to the freedom of means, however, the 
above line of reasoning in favor of maximal scope for the political argument becomes 
feeble. In light of the limitation of resources, there is no such thing as a maximally in-
clusive right to the means for scientific research.  
On a constructive note, it seems reasonable to suggest that access to the means of 
research, insofar as it is justified by a political argument in the present sense, should 
increase with the political relevance of the research project in question.9 This sugges-
                                                          
9 Brown and Guston (2009) reach a similar conclusion on this point. 
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tion cannot diffuse the worries about the definition of political relevance altogether.10 
However, faced with the limitations of a world of finite resources, the societal chal-
lenge to determine the political relevance of scientific research in a way that avoids 
monopolies of definition becomes an inevitable one. 
6. Conclusions 
To wrap up the discussion of the political argument, I will briefly summarize its 
strengths and limitations. The argument rests on strong grounds, namely on the pro-
tection of an important precondition for the democratic process. Even so, it is worth 
noting that this is far from establishing an argument that trumps all other societal con-
cerns. The principle supported by it stands in competition with other principles that 
can be defended as preconditions for the democratic process. This may be of particular 
importance in so far as access to the means for research is concerned. Note in this con-
text that the preconditions for a functioning democratic process have been argued to 
include also the fulfillment of certain social needs, and thus to provide basic justifica-
tion for welfare expenditures (Waldron 1993). Furthermore, there is a wide consensus 
that politically based principles such as these cannot trump basic individual rights.  
One strength of the political argument is that it can reach beyond the level of the 
individual scientist. It is in principle also suitable for the defense of a whole research 
community or discipline’s right to determine their own research agenda, undisturbed 
by the interference of political powers. Note, however, that this is due to the purely 
negative character of the argument. It is in essence an argument against political con-
trol of the research agenda that does nothing to establish a positive claim with regard 
to how the research agenda should be determined instead. While scientific self-gov-
ernment on the level of disciplines might be a convenient answer, it is not thereby es-
tablished as the only feasible alternative. Besides the extreme options of control by 
major political powers on the one hand and pure disciplinary self-organization on the 
other, there might also be other ways to determine the scientific agenda by more in-
clusive and democratic procedures. For example, it is imaginable to employ some of 
the participative instruments that have been occasionally and tentatively employed in 
recent European science and technology governance, such as stakeholder hearings, 
citizen panels and consensus conferences (cf. Douglas, 2005, Hagendijk et al., 2005). 
The considerations of the political argument for scientific freedom, rightly understood, 
leave many options open. 
                                                          
10 However, as political relevance now becomes a matter of degrees, it may alleviate them. Should the 
definition of political relevance be swayed by powerful political interference, the effect will at least be 
merely a gradual one. 
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The strength of the political argument varies across different areas of research. 
We have seen that at least when conceived as an argument for the politically unregi-
mented accessibility of means for research, the claims that can be established by it are 
proportional to the political relevance of the line of research in question. 
As a genuine limitation of the political argument we discovered that it cannot 
hold sway for lines of scientific research whose results will be restricted in their acces-
sibility. Another way to put this is to say that the argument is conditional on an effec-
tive system of communicating and publicizing research results. At least as impor-
tantly, we have seen that it is also conditional on a social structure of the research 
community that encourages a pluralism of approaches. 
Compare this to the results of our earlier examination of the epistemological ar-
gument. It establishes an individualized free choice of research projects and ap-
proaches. One might call this a micro-autonomy, as the argument cannot be invoked 
to establish the autonomy of higher order actors such as disciplines or communities. 
The function of the epistemological argument is to establish said micro-auton-
omy as an epistemically advantageous form of organization for collective knowledge-
generating efforts. The argument is therefore of decidedly instrumentalist character: 
its strength cannot surpass whichever value we attribute to the goal of attaining the 
kind of knowledge we expect to emerge from the research in question. In many cases, 
we have good reasons to assign great value to the epistemic aims of science—be it be-
cause they promise to enhance our understanding of our world and our place within 
it, or because they are expected to contribute to the development of technologies that 
will help solve our societal problems and improve our health and our prosperity. 
However, there are other individual and societal goals, and these are not incommen-
surable with our epistemic goals. Where freedom of research (as based on epistemic 
reasons) stands in conflict with other principles derived from other societal goals, the 
epistemic ends of research will have to be compared and weighed against these other 
goals, and the epistemological argument’s strength will only be relative to the result of 
this weighing. The weighing also legitimately includes consideration of the cost of re-
search—both in the narrower sense of financial cost and in the wider sense of risks 
and moral concerns. If a well-informed public deems any of these costs of a concrete 
line of research higher than the expected epistemic benefits, then these concerns can 
limit the claim to scientific freedom in that case. 
As we have seen, the epistemological argument is conditional on a functioning 
system of incentives, or otherwise the claim that individual freedom will lead to an 
efficient division of cognitive labor cannot be compelling. We have also noted that the 
epistemological argument draws its persuasiveness from a claim to the efficient use of 
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local and global knowledge about the research system, and that it is therefore condi-
tional on a social structure of science that enables and encourages free and open inter-
action between scientists. 
In comparison, one point worth noting is that both major arguments for scientific 
liberty bank on the advantages of pluralism and diversity in science. A simple way of 
extracting a moral from this is that pluralism and diversity in science will always be at 
least as valuable as scientific freedom—at least in so far as the latter is supported by 
the arguments I have reconstructed. 
Comparison also makes clear that the two arguments partially overlap and in 
some sense also complement each other in terms of the kinds of scientific freedom 
they support. However, it is also obvious that neither of them is sweeping or absolute, 
that is to say that the force of each argument must be weighed against competing so-
cietal interests and values, and that there is no guarantee that together they cover the 
whole ground. 
What is more, the force of each of these arguments is relative to weighings and 
calibrations that involve difficult value judgments, such as: What is the relative politi-
cal significance of this line of research? How do the epistemic aims of this research 
project compare to, say, the goal of reducing the totality of human-inflicted suffering 
of higher animals? In a liberal democracy, none of these determinations can reasona-
bly be left to the monopoly of any one agent or institution. They will consequently 
have to be subject to public deliberation. For this reason, appeal to a principle of free-
dom of research is not suitable to replace public deliberation on the ends and means of 
science. It should therefore never mark the end, but rather the beginning of public de-
bate.  
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